One Hat Too Many?
Investment Desegregation in Private Equity
William A. Birdthistlet & M. Todd Hendersontt
The nature of private-equity investing has changed significantly as two dynamics
have evolved in recent years:portfolio companies have begun to experience seriousfinancial distress,and generalpartnershave started to diversify and desegregatetheir investment
strategies Both developments have led private-equity shops-once exclusively interested
in acquiringequity positions through leveraged buyouts- to invest in other tranches of
the investment spectrum, most particularlypublic debt. By investing now in both private
equity and public debt of the same issuer,generalpartners are generating a host of new
conflicts of interestbetween themselves and their limited partners,between multiple general partnersin the same consortia,and between private investors and public shareholders
In this Article, we identify and explore these various new tensions that have begun
to arise in the private-equity industry. We then propose and examine an array of possible ways to eliminate or alleviate those conflicts, exploring the regulatory,fiduciary,and
pragmaticstrengths and weaknesses of each approach.Generalpartnerscan seek investor unanimity or consent for follow-on investments, but certain tax and practicalbarriers complicate that approach.Alternatively, they can opt for a range of architectural
prophylaxes to protect against conflicts. These add costs on everyone, however, and,
experience in relatedfields shows, they do not work. Investors,for theirpart,can attempt
to diversify their own investment holdings to counterbalance risk, but this still leaves
some vulnerable to opportunisticfund managers, and may increase costs for all investors
as well. We propose a less costly and more efficient solution: advisers and investors
should work together to createa vibrant secondary market for private-equity interests to
create a salutary exit option, which would in turn discipline the investment behavior of
fund managers in this turbulent new investing environment.
INTRODUCTION
We've adopted a policy not to wear more hats than you have
heads.... And we think wearing an equity hat and a debt hat is one
hat too many.

-Wilbur L. Rossl

When the private-equity shop Apollo Management recently purchased the distressed debt of one of its portfolio companies, Linens 'n
Things, business commentators wondered what was afoot. Was Apollo's
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legendary chief, Leon Black, throwing good money after bad in an attempt to cut his losses? Or, instead, did he know something the bondholders did not? These queries-like so many academic explorations
into private equity and other collective investment vehicles-focus upon
the role of funds as investors. Is Linens 'n Things more likely to succeed
under private or public ownership, and why? Are leveraged buyouts
(LBOs) an efficient realignment of interests or simply a wealth transfer
with high transaction costs? What can private-equity investments tell
us about corporate governance in general? These are interesting questions, to be sure, and ones other authors in this Issue will no doubt explore, but they leave unaddressed important issues about the very
structure and management of private investment funds themselves.
These fund formation topics and, specifically, hidden conflicts in the
industry's structure and operation amid today's new world of private
investing are the focus of our Article.'
Whatever may have been the reason Apollo purchased the distressed debt of Linens 'n Things, the consequence of this decision is that
Apollo (acting through its investment managers) now oversees two
separate funds with investments in different and conflicting segments of
the capital structure. This dual position raises significant legal questions
since Apollo owes fiduciary duties to investors in both funds. The time
may come, as the Apollo situation seems to herald, when general partners must choose between favoring their debt investments or their equi2
See generally Scott J. Davis, Would Changes in the Rules for Director Selection and Liability Help Public Companies Gain Some of PrivateEquity'sAdvantages?, 76 U Chi L Rev 83 (2009)
(examining how public companies could adopt the advantages of private equity through changes to
legal rules regarding the selection and liability of directors); Ronald W. Masulis and Randall S.
Thomas, Does Private Equity Create Wealth? The Effects of Private Equity and Derivatives on
CorporateGovernance,76 U Chi L Rev 219 (2009) (arguing that private-equity management structures are superior to public-company governance in monitoring derivatives investment and risk
exposure); Eric L. Talley, Public Ownership,Firm Governance and Litigation Risk, 76 U Chi L Rev
335 (2009) (studying the relationship between corporate governance structure and litigation risk,
and finding that many of the governance features instituted by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act do not
decrease a firm's exposure to litigation risk).
3
Private-equity managers are typically compensated using a "2 and 20" scheme, in which
the general partner of a fund receives a 2 percent management fee and a 20 percent stake in the
fund's profits. Most academic papers focus on issues concerning the "20" while this Article is about
issues that concern the "2." That is, we explore questions relating to fund structure and formation
rather than acquisitions and investments.
4
As discussed below, partners in a private-equity fund may be able to reduce or eliminate
these duties in some circumstances through waiver or choice of law. The law is unclear as to the
exact parameters under which this diminishment of fiduciary duties can be accomplished, if at all.
The prospect of eliminating fiduciary and similar duties entirely, however, is very unlikely. For a
discussion of this issue and why fiduciary duties may stand in the way of efficient contracting, see
Douglas G. Baird and M. Todd Henderson, Other People's Money, 60 Stan L Rev 1309, 1328-33
(2008) (explaining that fiduciary duties, since they cannot be waived, often interfere with efficient
ex ante bargains).
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ty investments; at that moment, conflicts of interest will be unavoidable
and may force general partners into an untenable position!
Apollo's distressed debt investment subsequent to its earlier
(failed) equity investment-an investment pattern known in the industry as "loan to re-own"-is not an isolated sequence. This phenomenon
is growing as many companies acquired recently via LBOs begin to fall
on hard times and (according to lawyers and bankers familiar with
many of these deals) begin to attract debt investments from the very
investment firms that imposed the leverage upon them in the first place.
This trend is likely to continue. According to Standard & Poor's, as of
March 2007, over ninety US firms were teetering on the edge of bankruptcy, and over half of these had been involved in LBOs during the
recent credit boom Buyout firms involved in these deals are eagerly
evaluating loan to re-own investments, but their advisers, several of
whom we interviewed for this project, voice concern about the legal
implications of such investments. Like the fiduciary conflicts inherent
in down-round investments made by venture capitalists in struggling
startup companies, these private-equity, loan to re-own deals are plagued by potential fiduciary pitfalls. We show in this Article that inefficient regulations likely exacerbate these problems by forcing fund managers into suboptimal fund design.
The potential interfund (and intrafund) manager conflict embedded in a loan to re-own transaction is just one example of a broader and
growing phenomenon in private investing. There was a day, not so long
ago, when investment managers practiced a form of strategic segregation: venture capitalists focused upon early-stage investments in startups
with an eye toward exiting through an initial public offering; privateequity investors took controlling equity positions in established companies with the intention of improving profitability; and vulture investors
bought the debt of distressed companies in the hope of controlling the
firm's reorganization. Private-equity funds did not act like venture
capitalists or vultures, nor vice versa. One underappreciated benefit of
5 We are not privy to the details of the Apollo transactions, so we use this example for illustrative purposes only. Consider, for example, Jonathan Keehner and Pierre Paulden, KKR Tries to
Avoid Masonite Filing As Owner,Creditor (Update 1) (Bloomberg Oct 14, 2008), online at http://
www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=aTaYYIFKKHNk (visited Jan 11, 2009).
Megan Barnett, Linens 'n Debt 'n Equity, Portfolio.com (May 14, 2008), online at http://
6
(visited Jan 11,
www.portfolio.com/news-markets/top-5/2008/05/14/Apollo-Buys-Debt-in-Linens
2009) (discussing the risks and potential rewards of Apollo's debt investment into Linens 'n Things).
7 This status means a credit rating of B- or lower. The three-year default rate for firms
with this rating is 43 percent, compared with 28 percent for firms rated above B-. Shanny Basar,
Apollo Acts to Protect Its Stake in Linens Holding, eFinancialNews (May 13, 2008), online at
http://www.efinancialnews.com/archive/keyword/linensholding/l/content/2350610801 (visited Jan 11,
2009) (subscription only) (discussing Apollo's actions to take control of Linens 'n Things).
8 See Baird and Henderson, 60 Stan L Rev at 1328-30 (cited in note 4).
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this former segregation was that fund managers had a simple objective:
maximize the value of the particular slice of the capital structure in
which the fund's investors were investing. In legal parlance, the fund
manager (a "general partner" in nearly all cases) owed a fiduciary duty
to fund investors (almost always "limited partners"), which meant that
the general partner was legally obliged to focus entirely and without
conflict on maximizing the value of these specific investments.!
But this narrow focus is quickly expanding, and as it does so the
traditional roles in the capital structures are beginning to blur. Changes
in the fortunes of the buyout market and, more generally, the credit
markets have prompted fund managers to diversify their investment
strategies. Private-equity fund managers have begun to expand their
investment strategies from the typical and routine LBO to include
investments in debt and more exotic financial instruments, such as options, credit instruments, and other derivatives. The Blackstone Group,
Apollo Management, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co (KKR), The Carlyle Group, and other buyout firms have recently launched new funds
that specialize in such alternative investment strategies.1° These new
investments undoubtedly make financial sense for the fund managers,
as they likely expand the managers' expected profits while the diversification of strategies simultaneously reduces the managers' risk. Desegregation, however, is not without significant pitfalls to investors in
those managers' funds.
At the same time, other investors, such as hedge funds, traditional
investment and commercial banks, and even stodgy old insurance companies are also diversifying their investment strategies." Goldman Sachs
now has numerous private-equity funds and hedge funds under its management, as well as countless other esoteric investment vehicles. Goldman is certainly not alone. Nearly every large financial institution in
the US financial markets-from Bank of America to Bain Capital and
investment houses in between -practices a broadening swath of the
spectrum of private investing. In the Apollo deal described above,
Apollo's two co-investors in the original equity buyout were the hedge
fund Silver Point Capital and the private investing arm of the realty

9 See Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA) § 404(b)(2) (1997), in 6 ULA 143 (West
2001) (defining the general partner's duty of loyalty as including obligations to refrain from
working on behalf of interests adverse to the limited partnership).
10 See Danny Fortson, Vulture Funds Set to Pounce on Struggling Companies,Independent
(London), Business 38 (Aug 16, 2007); Judy McDermott, KKR Launches New Investment Fund,
Bank Loan Rep (Apr 19,2004).
11 See Why the PrivateEquity Investment Style Drift?, Seeking Alpha (Apr 10,2008), online
at http://seekingalpha.com/article/7776-why-the-private-equity-investment-style-drift (visited
Jan 11, 2009).0I
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firm National Realty & Development Capital. In short, the lines between different types of private investing are smudging or even disappearing altogether, which raises a new set of serious issues for these
funds and their investors.
In this Article, we identify and discuss the potential problems inherent in this desegregation and offer preliminary thoughts on how
they and other similar conflicts may be ameliorated. We also examine
the normative question whether this development is truly a problem
from a social welfare perspective. We argue that diversification may in
fact be optimal, and the difficulties lie not so much in the potential
conflicts but in regulations that exacerbate such conflicts by forcing
the conflicts underground in ways that make them less likely to be
observed and priced by the market.
Part I briefly outlines the typical issues involved in private-equity
fund formation, focusing on the attractions and limitations of the industry's penchant for the limited partnership structure. Part II identifies specific conflicts of interest created by the blurring of private investment strategies using several real-world examples from the recent
downturn in the credit markets.
Part III suggests several approaches to mitigate the costs of conflicting investments by general partners. The most interesting of these
suggestions involves expanding the nascent secondary market in which
private-equity interests are traded. We offer the first academic description of this market and describe the impact that liquid secondary markets might have on ameliorating conflicts of interest. The intuition
here is novel but straightforward: easy exit reduces risks for investors
in particular parts of the capital structure and therefore imposes discipline upon fund managers.
Finally, we turn to normative questions about the desirability and
efficiency of conflicting investment positions. We argue that is it far
from clear that these investments are bad for society and present several
reasons why attempts to limit investment strategies, either by regulation
or litigation, may be self-defeating. Market and contractual solutions are
likely to be far superior, although the law may have some work to do to
create conditions that encourage free contracting on these issues.
I. FUND FORMATION IN THE PRIVATE-EQUITY INDUSTRY

Private-equity investment typically begins with a group of individuals deciding to offer their labor (and often their money) as asset
12 See Jonathan Keehner and Jason Kelly, Apollo's Linens 'n Things Unit Files for Bankruptcy
(Update 5) (Bloomberg May 2, 2008), online at http://www.bloomberg.com/appslnews?pid=
newsarchive&sid=asc4duDJUKow (visited Jan 11, 2009).0

The University of Chicago Law Review

[76:45

managers through an investment advisory entity that will raise funds,
identify investment opportunities, and subsequently oversee equity
investments in target firms. The investment adviser, however, does not

invest in and manage the target firms directly but rather creates subsidiaries, which are the private-equity funds, to hold investors' interests in
portfolio companies.
Private-equity funds are almost always established as limited partnerships. The private-equity investment adviser -or one of its subsidiaries-acts as general partner to these limited partnerships and makes all
decisions on investment in and operation of portfolio companies.'
Investors in private equity funds are limited partners; they contribute only money, not management." These limited partners are almost
always large institutional investors, such as university endowments, public pension funds, and other substantial pools of money; wealthy individuals rarely, if ever, invest as limited partners in private-equity funds."
A.

Attractions of the Limited Partnership Structure

Private-equity firms typically form funds using the limited partnership business form because of its favorable tax characteristics, as well as
its combination of contractual flexibility and legal default settings with
respect to fiduciary duties. The limited partnership, unlike the corporate
6
form, offers favorable "pass-through" tax treatment for investors.
The limited partnership form also provides freedom to the general and limited partners to contract over details about how the partnership will be organized and managed. Each limited partner invests pursuant to a detailed limited partnership agreement (LPA) negotiated by
the general partner and the investors.
13
In some deals, the general partner will operate with coventurers in the form of other
investment funds. These "partners" in the deal add another level of complexity. In addition, some
"public" investors are actually intermediaries, like pension funds or sovereign wealth funds. This
structure therefore implicates multiple levels of potential agency costs.
14
See Dictionaryof Finance and Investment Terms 302 (Barron's 4th ed 1995) (defining a
"limited partnership" as an "organization made up of a GENERAL PARTNER, who manages a
project, and limited partners, who invest money but have limited liability, and are not involved in
day-to-day management, and usually cannot lose more than their capital contribution").
15 See, for example, Kate D. Mitchell, CarriedInterest (July 11, 2007) (testimony of Managing Director of Scale Venture Partners before the Senate Committee on Finance, 110th Cong, 1st
Sess), online at http://www.nvca.org/pdflKMitchell-testimony-7-11-07.pdf (visited Jan 11, 2009)
(explaining that institutional investors constitute 95 to 99 percent of venture capital funds because "the capital needed by the emerging growth sector far outpaces [ I individual assets").
16
See IRC § 701. Subchapter S corporations and limited liability companies are impractical
and disfavored by the industry. Telephone interview with Raj Marphatia, Partner at Ropes & Gray
LLP (May 5,2008) ("Marphatia Interview"). See also Dictionary of Tax Terms 208 (Barron's 1994)
(defining "Pass-through Entity" as a "nontaxable entity such as a partnership, limited partnership, S
corporation ... [whose] income or expense is passed to the underlying owner and retains its character as, for example, ordinary income, capital gain (loss), or charitable contribution").
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In addition to providing the parties with transactional flexibility,
LPAs also serve to align the interests of general and limited partners
by setting forth their rights and responsibilities. The agreements specify the amount of the investor's capital commitment, the expected use
of proceeds, the likely timing of capital calls (against the commitment)," the fund's investment horizon, and, perhaps most importantly,
the general partner's compensation scheme.
The fiduciary duties that a general partner owes its limited partners are also important tools for aligning the interests of advisers and
investors, and they are determined as a function both of state law and
contractual terms negotiated in the LPA." In any particular jurisdiction, state law typically sets forth the fiduciary duties of partners, generally, and of general partners in a limited partnership, more specifically. 9
For the purposes of the US private-equity industry, the most relevant
jurisdictions are Delaware on the one hand and states that rely upon
uniform partnership acts on the other. Delaware statutes,nO by and large,
permit a broad degree of flexibility, granting parties wide latitude in
customizing fiduciary duties to their particular needs, rather than imposing a rigid mandate upon all parties regardless of sophistication.2'
The classic set of duties that a general partner owes to its limited
partners includes a duty of loyalty, a duty of care, and a related obligation of good faith and fair dealing. = Under these broad rubrics fall more
specific requirements. For instance, the duty of loyalty may subsume
more specific duties to account to the partnership for property or profit,
to refrain from dealing in a manner adverse to the partnership, and to
avoid competing with the partnership." Similarly, the duty of care may
17

An investor committing $100 million to a private-equity fund, for instance, will typically

agree to invest this sum over a period of time when the general partner makes investments in
portfolio companies. In practice, then, the general partner might call for $10 million from each
limited partner to make the first acquisition, and then subsequently call for another $10 million
as needed, and so forth. LPAs also routinely provide for rights or obligations regarding future
investments in other funds.
18
See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 Cal L Rev 795,832-34 (1983).
19 See Larry E. Ribstein, FiduciaryDuties and Limited PartnershipAgreements, 37 Suffolk
U L Rev 927,943-45,952 (2004).
20
Specifically, the Delaware Limited Partnership Act allows broad flexibility. See 6 Del
Code Ann § 17-1101(d)-(f) (Michie) ("A partnership agreement may provide for the limitation
or elimination of any and all liabilities for breach of contract and breach of duties (including fiduciary duties) of a partner.").
21
See Kenneth M. Jacobson, Fiduciary Duty Considerationsin Choosing between Limited
Partnershipsand Limited Liability Companies, 36 Real Prop 1, 5-8 (2001) (comparing RUPA to

Delaware's more flexibile requirements for a general partner).
22 See RUPA § 103(b), 6 ULA 73 ("The partnership agreement may not ... eliminate the
duty of loyalty ... unreasonably reduce the duty of care ...[or] eliminate the obligation of good
faith and fair dealing.").
23 Jacobson, 36 Real Prop at 7 (cited in note 21).
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encompass a duty to refrain "from engaging in grossly negligent or reckless conduct, intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation of law."'
Once private-equity players determine the universe of possible fiduciary duties in their given jurisdiction, their next task is to determine
the degree to which those duties are mandatory or merely defaultsthat is, the extent to which the general and limited partners forming a
private-equity fund may vary background duties via their contract, the
LPA. Uniform partnership acts do not expressly address the question
whether partners may waive, limit, or restrict fiduciary duties;" thus, in
the states governed by those statutes, courts have typically been called
upon to evaluate the validity of any attempts to modify baseline duties, such as by adjudicating whether or not specific activities
are "ma2
nifestly unreasonable" abridgements of a particular duty.
The Delaware limited partnership statute, in contrast to those of
other jurisdictions, is explicitly permissive, expressly adopting "the principle of freedom of contact" and allowing partners to specify their fiduciary duties." Professor Larry Ribstein provides thorough and illuminating guidance on the judicial and legislative aspects of this issue
and cites the deference that Delaware courts afford to the parties' attempts to contract around fiduciary duties. Ribstein quotes Vice Chancellor Leo Strine, Jr, who opines that Delaware courts
will not be tempted by the piteous pleas of limited partners who
are seeking to escape the consequences of their own decisions to
become investors in a partnership whose general partner has clearly exempted itself from traditional fiduciary duties. The [Act] puts
investors on notice that fiduciary duties may be altered by partnership agreements, and therefore that investors should be careful to
read partnership agreements before buying units.a
Moreover, in 2004, the Delaware statute was even more unequivocally liberalized to permit the entire elimination of all fiduciary duties
24

Id, quoting RUPA § 404(c), 6 ULA 143.

25 See Larry E. Ribstein, Fiduciary Duty Contracts in UnincorporatedFirms, 54 Wash &

Lee L Rev 537, 571-77 (1997) (detailing how courts have handled issues regarding waiving,
limiting, or restricting fiduciary duties in light of RUPA's silence on this matter).
26
Compare id (collecting cases that enforce a fiduciary duty waiver), with id at 581-83
(collecting cases that hold a fiduciary duty waiver did not cover the conduct in question and
holding that default fiduciary duty rules applied). See also RUPA § 103(b)(5), 6 ULA 73 ("[Tjhe
partnership agreement may prescribe the standards by which the performance of the obligation
is to be measured, if the standards are not manifestly unreasonable.").
27 6 Del Code Ann § 17-1101(c).
28 Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations?,1 Berkeley Bus L J 183, 213-14 (2004), quoting
Miller v American Real Estate PartnersLP, 2001 WL 1045643, *8 (Del Ch). See also Ribstein, 54
Wash & Lee L Rev at 571-77 (cited in note 25) (observing that courts have routinely upheld

waivers and limitations of fiduciary duty in Delaware).
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other than the obligation of good faith and fair dealing.9 Since then,
however, no major judicial decisions have interpreted the new statutory
language, and legal advisers to private-equity managers express reservations about sweeping contractual attempts to waive common law
notions of fiduciary duty in these partnerships.
Thus, although certain fiduciary duties may be waived in privateequity funds' limited partnership agreements-particularly Delaware
limited partnerships -such waivers are still considered somewhat speculative and risky by general partners and almost certainly would not
apply to opportunistic behavior or other actions that constitute bad
faith or unfair dealing. Although private-equity parties may contractually specify the duties that govern their relationship, absolute waivers of the duty of loyalty will be construed narrowly and will turn on
the facts and circumstances surrounding the waiver.' It is therefore
not surprising that notwithstanding Vice Chancellor Strine's rather
blunt characterization, lawyers familiar with these deals, even ones in
Delaware, are skeptical that Delaware's laissez-faire approach will insulate waivers of fiduciary duties from judicial review, especially in the
type of conflicted investments we discuss in this Article.'
B.

Limitations of the Limited Partnership Structure

What distinguishes private equity from other forms of investment
in private firms is the lock-in of capital in the fund for a long period of
time. Investors cannot simply withdraw their money whenever they
please, regardless of whether they may need it for another purpose
(such as paying pensions) or because the investment is no longer earning acceptable rates of return. An investment in managing newly private companies with large debt burdens is, by its very nature, a longterm proposition, and investors in buyouts need the fortitude and financial resources for a long haul. Private-equity funds share this lock-in
characteristic with venture capital funds, as distinguished from hedge
funds, mutual funds, bank deposits, and broker accounts, all of which
are usually redeemable with shorter notice or even upon demand.
This lock-in feature generates agency costs between the general
partner and limited partners. Limited partners have neither voice (since
this would make them not "limited") nor exit (since there is but a
29 The Delaware limited partnership statute provides that "the partner's ... duties may be
expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions in the partnership agreement." 6 Del Code
Ann § 17-1101(d).
30 For examples of circumstances in which a waiver may be suspect, see Ribstein, 37 Suffolk U L Rev at 945-52 (cited in note 19).
31 Telephone interview with David Chapin, Partner at Ropes & Gray LLP (May 9, 2008)
("Chapin Interview").
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meager secondary market for their interests), one or both of which are
considered essential for imposing discipline upon managers. Some limited partners can reduce managerial slack or self-interest by negotiating side letters for access to greater information (though not for greater
management rights) or preferred exit rights. Below, we propose a potential solution: the creation of a robust secondary market in privateequity investments, which would allow for accurate pricing of investments, and therefore a marginally greater incentive for managers to act
in the best interest of investors. But this nascent market may yet be
years away from providing sufficient liquidity to mitigate agency costs
significantly in this environment.
The lock-in problem is exacerbated by the kinds of conflicts of interest that we describe in this Article. Historically, agency costs in private equity were quite low, notwithstanding lock-in of capital. The lack
of exit and voice did not create serious problems because the highpowered incentives of general partners generally aligned the interests
of managers and investors. This alignment begins to diverge, however,
when general partners acquire investments of different types in different parts of the capital structure or along different time horizons. We
now consider these potential conflicts.
II. THE NEW CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

The Apollo transaction described above is not the only exemplar
of the new phenomenon of heightened conflicts in a desegregated financial world. Another recent instance involved TPG Capital and
Goldman Sachs and their investment in Alltel Corporation. In May of
2007, TPG and Goldman each invested $1.6 billion in equity in an LBO,
with four banks-Goldman, Citigroup Inc, Barclays PLC, and Royal
Bank of Scotland Group-underwriting $21.5 billion of debt.32 When
the credit markets froze, the banks absorbed most of those loans on
their own balance sheets; one year later, when the credit markets began to thaw, the banks began selling their debt at a discount. Indeed,
one of the buyers in those Alltell debt sales was TPG, who issued the
debt in the first place and purchased some of the loans from Citigroup
for ninety cents on the dollar in April 2008. Then, just two months later in June 2008, the private-equity consortium sold Alltel to Verizon
for $28.1 billion, generating a 28 percent return for the original private-equity investors. In addition, TPG also profited from a rise in the
value of the Alltel debt that it acquired.3 Thus, in just over a year, TPG
32 See Serena Ng and Peter Lattman, Alltel Deal Yields a Big Profit,Wall St J Cl (June 6,
2008) (reporting that co-investors contributed the balance of the $4.6 billion equity investment).
33 Id.
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executed investments in two levels of Alltel's capital structureprivate equity and public debt-and profited from both.
Although this diversification may at times make perfect economic sense for investors-as it clearly did in the Alltel deal-and may

benefit managers, it nevertheless raises potential conflicts of interest
that, if not addressed properly, may result in untenable legal positions
for investment managers.' As we show, these conflicts may be exacerbated by existing legal rules and regulations, which may have the impact of driving potentially efficient transactions into suboptimal structures that create the potential for abuse by investment managers at
the expense of their investors.
In this Part, we consider the various types of conflicts of interest
likely to arise as a result of desegregation, using illustrations from the
recent downturn in the private-equity markets. The past five years have
seen an unprecedented boom in the number and size of private-equity
buyouts. From 2001 to 2007, investors conducted hundreds of buyouts,
and total assets under the management of private-equity funds doubled
to over $700 billion. 5 In 2007, however, the buyout wave crested and
began to recede as a shortage of credit drove up the costs of financing
debt-laden acquisitions.6
Buyers in transactions that were signed but not closed attempted
to walk away, generating numerous lawsuits. 7 Completed acquisitions,
like that of Linens 'n Things, also struggled as broadly challenging macroeconomic conditions undermined some of the financial rationale
underlying certain acquisitions. Several recent buyouts have headed toward bankruptcy, and as a result, the bonds that financed these acquisitions have traded at large discounts to par value. According to Fortune,
43 percent of LBOs transacted in the past four years were distressed as of
34
TPG's investment reeks of insider trading, since it likely knew about the upcoming
Verizon deal when it purchased Alltel debt at a discount from the banks, who likely did not know
about the deal. If TPG bought Alltel stock based on this private information, the transaction
would be illegal. But for a debt transaction between two large, sophisticated financial entities, the
rules are different. TPG and the banks likely executed "big-boy" letters waiving any reliance and
accepting that one or the other might have private information. See Baird and Henderson, 60
Stan L Rev at 1339-1441 (cited in note 4).
35 Diana Farrell, Private Equity Isn't Fading Away, Bus Wk (Nov 20,2007), online at http:f/
www.businessweek.comlglobalbiztcontentnov2007/gb20071120_276791.htm (visited Jan 11, 2009)
(estimating the assets under management in global private funds as part of an examination of
private equity's returns and the influence of private equity on corporate governance).
36 See David Rothnie, The Private Equity Fee Stream Dries Up, Deal Journal Blog (Wall St J
Mar 31, 2008), online at http:/blogs.wsj.corn/deals/2008/03/31/the-private-equity-fee-stream-dries-up/
(visited Jan 11, 2009) ("[P]rivate equity deal making has been one of the biggest casualties of the
credit crisis and has hit revenue at investment banks.").
37 See, for example, Susan Pulliam and Peter Lattman, As Buyout Bust Turns Bitter, A
Major Deal Lands in Court, Wall St J Al (Sept 9,2008) (describing the recent lawsuit over Apollo's attempt to walk away from a 2007 agreement to buy Huntsman Corp).
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the spring of 2008.M These soured deals create opportunities for downround investments and, as we explore next, potential opportunism.
A. Advisers versus Investors: The Down-round Problem
Private investments regularly involve multiple rounds of financing. Conducting investments in orderly stages permits the contracting
parties to reduce information asymmetries, to resolve market uncertainties, and to ascertain and better manage risks. Unsurprisingly, highly
risky investments are typically made incrementally and in increasing
amounts as the investment in question matures, particularly in the venture capital industry.
Venture funds invest not only when the passage of time reveals
good news but also when it reveals bad news. This latter stage is known
as the "down round," a round of investing when fortunes for the target
have declined. In the prototypical case, a venture capital fund that has
taken a large equity stake in the portfolio firm (usually in the form of
convertible preferred stock) agrees to lend the firm additional money
to stay afloat (usually in the form of an emergency loan that is convertible into equity) until the firm can secure additional financing or conduct an initial public offering. Down-round investing generates serious
conflicts of interest for the venture capital investors because the fund
stands on both sides of the transaction: representatives of the venture
capital fund typically both sit on the board of directors of the startup
and negotiate against the interests of the firm as a lender of last resort.
These conflicts are well known in the venture capital industry, and lawyers in these scenarios counsel extreme caution to participants in the
event of down-round investments by funds that have previously invested in earlier stages of financing.39
Private-equity investments historically consisted of only one round
of financing: an initial equity investment conducted via an LBO. Multiple rounds do not generally make sense in private equity, because an
LBO is a comprehensive event in which a discrete equity investment is
tied to a restructuring of the target firm's entire balance sheet. Multiple
rounds may also be less necessary since the target businesses in question are well established, have mature cash flows, and are subjected to
extensive due diligence.
Recently, though, the declining market has brought down-round financing to the world of private equity. General partners are now launching funds specifically designed to acquire down-market discounted debt,
Allan Sloan and Katie Benner, The Year of the Vulture, Fortune 62,70 (May 26,2008).
See Matthew . Quilter, Austin Choi, and Sayre E. Stevick, Duties of Directors:Venture
CapitalistBoard Representatives and Conflicts of Interest, 1312 PLI/Corp 1101,1103-04 (2002).l]
38
39
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especially those of portfolio companies that the same general partners
initially took private. Recent media reports allude to, but have few details
oft down-round private-equity investments made by Apollo and TPG (in
Harrah's Entertainment debt) and by KKR and TPG (in TXU debt).'
That these follow-on investments are viewed as profit-making opportunities by general partners should not come as a surprise. Most obviously, the general partner is often attempting to cut its losses and to
retain control of the portfolio company. Such a move may boost the
general partner's overall performance statistics and help mitigate any
reputational losses that might arise from a "failed" buyout.4' As noted in
the Alltel deal above, such investments can also be nearly a sure thing; a
fund with private information about the value of debt held by another
may be able to capitalize upon that information without liability.
Thus, one way to think about desegregation is as deal insurance.
Buyouts are very risky ventures, and a general partner that operates both
an equity fund and a debt fund that invest in the same portfolio companies may be able to reduce the overall risk of buyouts. Consider an equity investment of $100 in a portfolio company that expects to return 50
percent in five years but has a 5 percent chance of declaring bankruptcy,
in which case the value of the investment will be zero. The general partner also has a $100 commitment from the equity investors to invest in
the debt of the portfolio company in the event of distress. The general
partner will be uniquely positioned to identify profit-making opportunities in the portfolio company's debt, since it knows the company-and
can therefore determine the true value of the company's debt-better
than anyone else. The general partner's equity investors would thus
simply be hedging the 5 percent risk of default by participating in profits that can be made in the event of default. If the investment in distressed bonds expects a similar 50 percent return with 95 percent probability, and a return of negative 10 percent otherwise, the combined
investment in equity and debt earns a return of 45 percent instead of
the 43 percent from the equity investment only.42
Notwithstanding these calculations, limited partners in privateequity funds may not be as bullish about these investments as are the
See, for example, Sloan and Benner, Fortune at 66 (cited in note 38).
See Barnett, Linens 'n Debt 'n Equity (cited in note 6) (suggesting that Apollo invested
in Linens 'n Things's debt both to gain a return for investors and to prevent a reputational "black
40
41

eye" from "[p]utting a portfolio company into bankruptcy").
42
In the equity-only investment case, the investors' expected value is $150 times
95 percent plus $0 times 5 percent, which equals $142.50 or a return of approximately 43 percent
on a $100 investment. In the equity and debt investment case, the investors also expect a $42.50
return on their $100 equity investment, but they also get a $47 return on their additional $100

debt investment ($150 times 95 percent plus $90 times 5 percent equals $147). Therefore, the
combined return on a $200 investment is $289.50, or a 45 percent return.
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general partners. First and foremost, these investors can self-insure,
perhaps at much lower cost, through their own diversification strategy.
This discrepancy is especially acute because down-round investments
create significant potential conflicts of interest between the general
partner and its investors. The general partner has a fiduciary obligation
to maximize the return for all of its investors, a duty that may not be
attainable if the general partner holds different positions in a failing
firm's capital structure through different private-equity funds comprising different limited partners. 3 If a portfolio company becomes distressed, or most obviously goes bankrupt, one set of limited partners
will inevitably lose at the expense of others." Investors have plenty of
alternative investment options free from these conflicts.
Advisers versus Investors versus Shareholders

B.

Potential conflicts may also arise between the investors in various
funds and the duties owed to a publicly traded general partner's own
shareholders. Several large private-equity firms are now publicly traded
on stock exchanges, thus forcing investment managers to choose among
three sets of investors: equity fund investors, debt fund investors, and
shareholders in the general partner. The interests of the general manager's shareholders will trump any individual set of limited partners'
interests. This preference may exist for a variety of reasons. First, managers, who are compensated in part through stock, will be more responsive to equity prices than the views of limited partners with respect to follow-on investments. Second, the threat of litigation from
public shareholders is greater because of the saliency of potential
breaches, the larger incentives of plaintiffs' lawyers to bring these cases, and the stricter fiduciary duties that likely apply to public shareholders compared with limited partners.
C. Advisers versus Advisers
One more set of conflicts is worth mentioning briefly. In many recent private-equity deals, funds have formed consortia with other private
investment funds, such as hedge funds and real estate investment trusts.

This is just another example of the "two hats" phenomenon in bankruptcy.
This down-round problem is not unique to private equity. Venture capitalist investors
face significant conflicts in the investments they make in startup firms, since they often sit on the
board of these firms and are often in the best position to loan the startup money in the event it
falls on hard times. These down-round investments can be seriously dilutive to the other (common) shareholders, and herein lies the potential for conflict. See Quilter, Choi, and Stevick, 1312
PLI/Corp at 1119-21 (cited in note 39).
43
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These outside investors may have different investment horizons and objectives, which in turn may exacerbate potential down-round conflicts.
To see the untenable position that fund managers may find themselves in, consider the following simple case. A publicly traded general
manager creates a fund (Fund A) to invest in the LBO of Acme Inc.
This LBO investment will be conducted jointly in a consortium with
two hedge funds. When the fortunes of Acme deteriorate, the general
manager of Fund A creates a second fund (Fund B) to invest in Acme's
debt. One of the hedge funds agrees to join the second fund, as do half
of the original investors in Fund A. When making decisions about the
fortunes of Acme, as it must inevitably do, the general manager now
finds itself in the position of having to consider the interests of maximizing the return to its own public shareholders, complying with the
limited partnership agreements in both Fund A and Fund B (as well as
any fiduciary duty overlays), and the contractual obligations it owes to
its joint venture partners. Satisfying all parties is theoretically possible
but highly unlikely, particularly given that the conflict of interest between Fund A and Fund B alone may be substantial, such that the general partner will have to favor one over the other in the event of a
bankruptcy or reorganization of Acme.
III. PROPOSALS FOR AMELIORATING
THE NEW CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

These conflicts of interest are not just theoretical but are in practice causing significant uncertainty among deal planners, funds, investors, and other participants in the industry. Corporate lawyers and
other fund advisers with whom we have spoken describe an atmosphere of fiduciary fear in a business that has rapidly expanded beyond
its historical contours.4" The increasing diversification of investment
products offered by a single investment adviser combined with the
unpredictable inversions of a distressed market is stretching the ability
of advisers to maintain clear and uncomplicated fiduciary relationships with their investors.4

45 Chapin Interview (cited in note 31); Telephone interview with Harold Hope, Managing
Director at Goldman Sachs Group, Inc (May 5,2008) ("Hope Interview"); Marphatia Interview
(cited in note 16).
46 This is not just a problem of complying with fiduciary duties. As noted above, fiduciary
duties may be waivable under certain circumstances, and, more surely, general partners and
investors have many choices of governing laws-ranging from Delaware to the Cayman Islands-and presumably some of these will have more permissive legal regimes regarding fiduciary duties. Nevertheless, investors may find themselves disadvantaged in conflict situations.
This might not result in a lawsuit from the jilted investors, if the law and waiver are clear, but it
does create potential inefficiencies.
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We suggest an array of possible mechanisms to mitigate conflicts
and describe their operation, benefits, and costs. Some of these options
are available today, while others may require years of additional evolution. Ultimately, we expect the private-equity market to move toward a
stable equilibrium in which these conflicts are well understood and effectively priced by the market. Here we hope to present modest suggestions for helping the industry's participants reach that equilibrium.
A. Obtaining Unanimity among Investors
The most obvious solution to interfund conflicts is to ensure that
the investors in the funds are identical. If the identity and ownership
interests of all relevant funds are the same, and participation of investors is voluntary and conducted with full disclosure of all possible conflicts,7 then this problem largely disappears, and what might at first
seem to be a conflict-laden situation is actually quite efficient.
1. Practical challenges to investor unanimity.
Several limits may stymie private-equity investors from obtaining
the unanimity of ownership and consent across funds necessary to ameliorate the potential conflicts described in a down-round investment.
First, some of the original equity-fund investors may choose not to
make a down-round investment for purely economic reasons. Although the investment may be sensible from the standpoint of the
general partner, investors may have reason to doubt the wisdom of
this diversification strategy. Investors can diversify themselves, perhaps at much lower cost. This option is especially attractive since investment vehicles such as vulture funds specialize in investing in the
debt of distressed firms. Such funds are likely to enjoy a competitive
advantage over private-equity investors, who have heretofore specialized only in equity investments in recapitalized businesses, not distressed debt. Private-equity managers add value by identifying LBO
targets and managing businesses with high debt burdens; they do not
specialize in workouts or restructurings, which is what would be involved by investing in debt. The private-equity firm may have private
information that trumps its lack of expertise in debt transactions, but
this advantage may not always be present. If investors can diversify in
other, less costly ways, as is surely possible, then the debt investment
by a private-equity fund may simply arise as an unwelcome product of

47 Although investing is generally presumed to be voluntary, a commitment made ex ante
without full disclosure of potential conflicts may nevertheless be voided by courts on the
grounds the investment was made on fraudulent or insufficient terms.
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agency costs, since the fund managers might prefer the investment for
their own, selfish reasons.
Second, some investors may face capital constraints that limit their
ability to double down on a particular investment. As noted above, investments in private equity are very large (averaging up to $100 million), and some investors may not have sufficient cash on hand to invest in additional funds at a given time. One solution to this problem
would be to reduce the commitment amount for a given investor to a
point where a down-round investment is possible. Thus, if a general
partner creates two funds of $1 billion each, an investor who committed $100 million to the equity fund but has only $20 million to invest
in the debt fund would be permitted to do so at that reduced level. If
the investors in both funds are identical, the other investors will have
to contribute more than their pro rata share from the first fund in order to make up the $80 million shortfall. This discrepancy will give
those other investors a disproportionate interest in the debt fund. If
these investors are larger or more valuable to the general partner,
which seems reasonable given their ability to contribute additional
money to the second fund, then the same potential conflict arises. Fund
complexes may possibly sort themselves along this dimension; in equilibrium, there may well be equity-only funds and equity-plus-debt funds,
in which investors agree ex ante to contribute to follow-on debt funds.
We discuss these and other contractual solutions more fully below.
Third, and related to the preceding capital constraints, there are
other restrictions investors may face on certain types of investments
or sizes of investments. For example, the overarching investment
guidelines for a university endowment or pension fund may restrict
(1) the percentage of its assets that may be invested in private equity;
(2) the percentage of these assets that may be invested in any one
portfolio company or series of companies; (3) the particular types of
investments (for example, distressed debt); or (4) any number of other
options that would effectively curtail the investor's ability to participate in down-round investments in a way free from conflicts. These
limitations may manifest themselves in rules, regulations, or contractual commitments. Most institutional investors-from pension funds
to insurance companies to university endowments-are subject to
some limitations upon their investing freedom, be it from federal capital adequacy requirements, investment duties owed under ERISA, state
insurance regulations, or agreements with the stakeholders or investors
behind the institutional investor.
2. Tax challenges to unanimity.
Tax law may also complicate the situation, making the unanimity
solution unlikely to arise in the market. The most pertinent potential
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problem in the private-equity context is the tax hit that comes when a
firm retires its debt: the Internal Revenue Code requires a portfolio
company to pay ordinary income tax rates on the difference between
the par value of its outstanding debt and the amount paid by the company to retire the debt. The difference between par and market value
paid is called "cancellation of indebtedness income" (COD or "income
from discharge of indebtedness").4 To take a simple example, if a portfolio company has $100 of outstanding bonds that are trading at discount to $80, the firm can buy back the debt but must pay taxes on the
$20 of COD it receives as part of the transaction.
The legal entity buying the debt of the portfolio company-the
private-equity manager-is not technically the portfolio company itself, but the Code does not permit this sort of structuring to evade
COD tax obligations. Specifically, attribution rules of the Code provide that if a party related to a debtor buys debt issued by that debtor,
then the debtor is treated as having bought the debt itself.' The consequence of such attribution is that the debtor will have to recognize
ordinary income in the amount of the difference between the face
value of the debt and the discounted price of the debt, just as if the
portfolio company had directly retired its own debt. So, a fund
deemed related to a portfolio company that buys the company's debt
at eighty cents on the dollar will trigger twenty cents worth of ordinary income to the company, which then flows through with a negative
impact on the return to investors in the fund.
This tax treatment may not be a barrier to efficient deals in some
cases. For one, the benefits from owning the portfolio company's debt
may exceed any tax costs. A special case is where the portfolio company has accrued net operating losses that it can use to offset any recognition of income, and therefore the COD would not necessarily
trigger the payment of any tax. Since many private-equity targets are
struggling businesses before the original LBO and may have an attractive set of losses on their balance sheets, the use of net operating
losses may preserve efficient deals. Another example involves situations in which the debtor is bankrupt or in the vicinity of insolvency."
The Code reflects the reality that a COD is a transaction that does not
generate cash in the way income normally does, and therefore imposing a tax in cases involving cash-poor debtors would be ineffective and
impose unnecessary costs on already frustrated creditors.

48
49

See IRC § 108.
See IRC § 108(e)(4).

50

See IRC § 108(a)(1)(A)-(B).
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Despite the existence of these special cases, COD taxes are considered by industry insiders to be a significant barrier to two-hat investing. 1 In addition, these tax rules likely lead to inefficient contract
design, in that they encourage investment entity structures that create
rather than solve conflict of interest problems. As discussed below, if
private-equity firms can structure potentially tax-negative transactions
in ways that attenuate the connection between the fund manager and
the portfolio company, they may be able to avoid large taxes.
Although media accounts of recent down-round investments contain little public information about the structure of such deals, they
nevertheless offer some clues of what is taking place. Interviews we
conducted with lawyers and principals in these deals also support the
contention that deals to invest in down-round debt are being structured in ways that reduce tax burdens or sidestep attempts to solve
fiduciary duty problems.2 These impediments are exacerbating potential agency problems and conflicts of interest.
(a) A structuralsolution to the tax challenge to unanimity. The most

obvious way to reduce tax burdens that might accrue to the portfolio
company (and therefore to the fund and its investors) is to obfuscate
or minimize the general partner's role in the down-round debt investment. As noted above, the cancellation of indebtedness is taxed if
the debtor (in this case, the portfolio company) buys the debt. This
rule also applies for parties related to the debtor, such as a general
partner that owns a majority stake in the equity of the portfolio company. Thus if the fund of a general partner has a 100 percent ownership interest in the equity of a debtor, and the general partner starts a
new fund to acquire the portfolio company's debt, the acquisition will
trigger a tax obligation for the portfolio company. If, however, the
general partner attenuates its participation in the entity acquiring the
debt it may-and we stress may-be able to avoid the tax hit. For example, the general partner could participate as a minority investor in
the debt-acquiring fund, and thereby attempt to fit within the Code's
carve-out for acquisitions made by entities that own less than 50 percent of the debtor. The general partner might still convey its private
information about the value of the debtor's outstanding debt, and thus
the fact of its investment would send sufficient signals to the majority
investors in the debt-acquiring fund.
The IRS may look askance at attempts to avoid taxes in this way
and therefore might deem the portfolio company under the control of
Chapin Interview (cited in note 31).
General partners, for instance, may attempt to obtain the consent of all investors. Id;
Hope Interview (cited in note 45).
51

52
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the debt-acquiring fund, even when the fund is not controlled by the
owner of the debtor's equity. The Code, however, gives the fund this
authority: acquisition by partners or affiliated entities is couched in
sufficiently broad terms-directly or indirectly-to permit collapsing

structures designed to avoid taxes. This sort of barrier, of course, merely gives general partners incentives to structure deals in even less
transparent ways for limited partners. The broader implications of tax
policy in this situation are beyond the scope of this discussion.
(b) A financialsolution to the tax challenge to unanimity. Another

way of avoiding taxes may be through the use of financial derivatives,
such as total-return swaps." A total-return swap is a contract between
two parties who agree to swap the returns from an asset (or combination of assets) for periodic cash payments, usually tied to a floating
interest rate such as LIBOR. For example, a holder of debt (bonds, for
instance) would agree to pay to a "buyer" of those bonds the total
return (interest plus par value) from the bonds in return for monthly
payments of a fixed amount above LIBOR plus a guarantee to make
the "seller" whole in the event of default. The key legal feature of a
total-return swap is that the party owning the underlying debt does
not transfer ownership to the buyer of the returns. The transaction is
thus a synthetic sale.
The application in the private-equity context is plain. A general
partner with private information about the value of a debtor's outstanding bonds that wants to eliminate potential tax burdens or fiduciary
conflicts arising from a lack of consent or unity of ownership interest
could arrange to "buy" the debtor's outstanding bonds or loans in a
total-return swap. In this way, the general partner and its investors in
the debt fund might avoid being deemed to "own" the underlying debt
of the portfolio company; they can instead simply enjoy the returns
that synthetically replicate those from the real debt. Therefore, one
might argue that the general partner's legal obligations (either in taxes
or state law duties) would be reduced accordingly.
Some anecdotal evidence suggests that private-equity firms are using precisely these methods to reduce their legal costs. A recent news
story described a typical down-round transaction as follows:

53 See Kara Scannell, SEC Swaps Opinion May Aid Hedge Funds,Wall St J C8 (June 6,2008)
(reporting on an opinion by the SEC and concluding that "hedge funds don't need to count certain
derivatives [such as total-return equity swaps] when determining how to report ownership stakes in
companies"). Like the tax example above, it is possible that the regulators-here the SEC or state
courts-would deem holders of total-return swaps to be "owners" for fiduciary duty purposes After
all, it is the economic impact of a contract that is germane for conflict of interest purposes; the other
sticks in the ownership bundle may be relevant, but they are much less important. Whether these
interests should be treated this way is an open question and is not at all obvious. ]
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Citi [the owner of the portfolio company's debt] didn't sell the paper to the buyout groups, contrary to what's been reported. Rather,
Citi and the [buyout] firms did so-called "total-return swaps." The
[buyout] firms forked over $3 billion of cash and agreed to pay Citi
interest (at a low 1 percent over the London Interbank Offered
Rate) on $7.8 billion. In return Citi will pay the firms the interest
and principal repayments generated by the $12 billion portfolio.'
The article describes the impetus for this contract choice as follows:
"Doing a swap rather than a sale avoids various complex financial and
legal problems."" Since these contracts are not publicly available, we
can only speculate that these "problems" are, or at least include, the tax
and practical issues we have raised. If true, this characterization points
out the potential design workarounds that fund managers are using,
and potentially the conflicts of interest they are creating as a result. If
unremedied, these approaches are likely to beget litigation from jilted
or disappointed investors.
(c) Normative thoughts on private-equity tax rules. We established
that existing tax rules create incentives for fund managers to structure
their investments in inefficient ways. At some level, complaining that
the current tax rules inhibit potentially efficient transactions is like
complaining that sleeping is an inefficient use of time. Every tax rule is
inefficient from this perspective, but the government still needs the
money. There are, however, legitimate questions about the purpose of
the COD tax rules, and whether this purpose is furthered in the case
of down-round investments by private-equity firms. If, for example,
private-equity investments are normatively a net benefit to social welfare, and if the tax rules contribute to structural obfuscation and thus
buried conflicts of interest, then the net gains from the current rules
might be slight or even negative.
It is important to note a few things here. For one, the social welfare calculation is not obvious or easy. Gains to the fund will be at the
expense of the existing firm shareholders, but these are likely the same
over the broad economy. From an ex ante perspective and behind the
veil, investors will not know whether they are investors in a fund or are
investors in a firm being bought out by a fund. In any event, so long as
the value of the firm is increased, the question of distribution, unless
systemically biased in the favor of one class or another, should be irrelevant. In other words, likely social gains from the discipline of the
market for (private) corporate control would then be the determining
factor in any social welfare calculation.
54 Allan Sloan and Katie Benner, The Buyout Boys Reload, Wash Post F01 (May 18, 2008).

55 Id.
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B.

Contractual Consent and Waiver by Investors
Another potential solution, related to the unanimity solution discussed above, is waiver of conflicts through private ordering among
the advisers of private-equity funds and their investors. This is a simple solution that has the virtues of being readily available and relatively inexpensive to implement. On the investor side, for instance, limited
partners in an equity fund that are given an opportunity to invest in a
potentially conflicting debt fund and, after receiving sufficient information to make an informed decision, agree, might be construed as
waiving any fiduciary duties. On the adviser side, another contractual
solution is for the general partner in a fund, as adviser, to agree via
contract to forswear certain investments -specifically, those transactions that are most likely to place the adviser in conflict with the limited partners in the fund.
Consider the investor waivers first. Although pure fiduciary duties,
like those of a trustee, cannot be waived, more modest fiduciary duties,
like those that arise by law in voluntary contractual relationships, are
sometimes viewed as waivable. This waivability is especially true when
the parties are sophisticated and capable of fending for themselves,
which is likely to be the case in the sort of investment partnerships we
are discussing here. Notwithstanding the less stringent species of fiduciary duties that obtain in these cases, the idea of a waiver will likely
be determined by the particular facts of the case. For example, an investor who agrees at the time of the initial investment in an equity
fund to authorize the general partner to invest in the debt of the portfolio company (whether or not the investor will tag along) will probably be construed as waiving a subsequent claim to breach of duty on
those grounds. In contrast, given the size and duration of financial
commitments needed for down-round investments in private equity, a
limited partner's decision not to invest after an equity commitment
has already been made may be viewed skeptically and as an invalid
waiver by courts sensitive to constraints upon the limited partner, such
as a lack of funds or restrictive investment guidelines.-'
The demand for this contractual solution could arise from either
the general partner in its efforts to attract capital at a profitable cost, or
from the limited partners who insist upon such a voluntary renunciation
as a condition of any investment. This is a potentially important distinction. If the demand comes from limited partners, it is possible that some
56
Whatever the likely outcome of these potential cases, the fact remains that for all existing deals ex ante waiver is impossible. There may be a new future equilibrium in which investors
sort themselves into funds based on expected future investments with full information, but this
practice is certainly not currently true or within sight.
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investors will use side letters to reach special deals on this point, and,
absent a general most-favored-nation policy, may lead to heterogeneity
across investors with respect to limits on follow-on investments. This
risk may be somewhat less if the general partner needs to include these
to attract capital broadly from this asset class. Looking forward many
years, we expect some sort of new equilibrium in which these conflicts
are solved, either by contract or otherwise, and priced by the market.
Consider now the advisor-side waivers. To a certain extent, limited
partnership agreements may already contain provisions restricting the
general partner's ability to invest in certain investments, typically for
strategic or tax reasons." In some such circumstances, the general
partner must either abandon those transactions or obtain certain approvals, either from each limited partner, a majority of limited partners, or the fund's advisory board. These restrictions, however, are intended primarily to focus the fund's investment strategy or to comply
with regulatory restrictions such as those imposed by ERISA, as opposed to minimizing fiduciary conflicts. Moreover, to the extent that
investment restrictions exist in a limited partnership agreement, those
limitations most typically will apply only to the general partner's activity with respect to the investments of the particular fund in question,
not necessarily to the general partner's (or its affiliates') activities in
other funds. Nevertheless, one could easily envisage the expansion of
such provisions to bar deleterious investments beyond merely the specific fund in question."
1. The challenge of monitoring contractual agreements.
Given the obviousness of contracting around this question and, indeed, the maturity and prevalence of rigorously negotiated limited
partnership agreements in the private-equity industry, one might begin
by asking why practitioners have not attempted to order this issue privately already. The readiest answer might be that the thorniness of adviser-investor conflicts is only now becoming apparent in a rapidly
evolving marketplace. A related explanation is that this problem may
not be obvious to investors in a single private-equity fund, only to

57
58

Chapin interview (cited in note 31).
The broader investing world already contains examples of investment advisers volunta-

rily renouncing activities that are not otherwise statutorily proscribed in order to create a
prophylaxis against conflicts to attract and retain investment. In the mutual fund industry, for
instance, investment advisers regularly adopted policies that prohibited market timing in their
funds before they were required to do so by statutes and regulations governing registered investment companies. See William A. Birdthistle, Compensating Power:An Analysis of Rents and
Rewards in the Mutual Fund Industry, 80 Tulane L Rev 1401,1456 (2006).
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those who are aware of the general partner's potentially conflicting activities in other funds or via other investment vehicles.
A more substantive limitation with private ordering is its vulnerability to imperfect monitoring. Investors or their intermediaries must be
able to monitor an adviser's fidelity to contractual provisions in order for
private ordering to be effective. In the private-equity context, this monitoring will require limited partners to know what their general partner
is doing. Investors must know not only what investments the general
partner is making in the investors' own fund (which should be readily
verifiable) but also what investments the general partner is making
through other funds in the adviser's complex (which could be difficult if
the investors are not investors in those other funds). Perhaps even more
challenging for limited partners might be observing what investments
are being made through other investment vehicles managed by other
investment advisers under the money manager's broadest organizational ambit-such as distantly affiliated vulture funds or hedge funds. Obviously, the less related the investment vehicle, the more remote the
possibility that investors will be able to monitor the adviser's activity.
The complexity and variations of investment practices make the task of
monitoring privately agreed-upon arrangements a serious challenge.
A prime example of the costs of imperfect monitoring comes from
the recent mutual fund timing scandal." Mutual fund managers promised investors they would not engage in market timing, which had the
consequence of favoring one set of investors (and fund managers) over
another set. But the profits to be made by reneging on this promise
were too great for the fund managers to resist the lure of market timing.
Although the breaches were eventually uncovered, and mutual fund
managers paid billions of dollars in settlements, this example points to
the limits of voluntary waivers in a world of imperfect monitoring. In
fact, unlike the mutual fund industry, in which market timing eventually came to light and was rigorously prosecuted by a host of regulators,
the private-equity field is not overseen by a similarly elaborate regulatory structure. Given its comparatively unregulated environment, the
private-equity industry might present more challenges and impose
higher costs for monitoring upon limited partners.
59 See, for example, Diane Levick, Insurer Settles Trading Charges, Hartford Courant Al
(July 24, 2007) (describing a $115 million settlement by the Hartford Financial Services Group,
Inc for its market-timing activities); PrudentialSettles Charges, Baltimore Sun ID (Aug 29,2006)
(describing a $600 million settlement by Prudential Financial, Inc for its market-timing activities);
In the Matter of Massachusetts Financial Services Co, John W. Ballen and Kevin R. Parke, SEC
Investment Advisers Act Release No 2213, SEC Investment Company Act Release No 26347,
SEC Administrative Proceeding No 3-11393 (Feb 5,2004), online at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
admin/ia-2213.htm (visited Jan 11, 2009) (detailing the market-timing activities at one mutual
fund advisory and the SEC's punishment for said activities).
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2. Additional challenges to contractual agreements.
Assuming the foregoing challenges of contractual solutions to adviser-investor conflicts could be overcome, we need not assume that
limited partners would demand a blanket prohibition on advisers from
acquiring any potentially contradictory investment positions. The more
nuanced-and wealth-maximizing-approach might instead be for limited partners either to require prior approval for such transactions or
to demand a participation in the adviser's financial gains from such
transactions. Such an approach would grant to limited partners the flexibility of assessing the value of such transactions and permitting those
that made financial sense. Similarly, general partners need not be chilled
against all such transactions - including potentially lucrative deals - but

instead could be encouraged to evaluate the total value of an investment, taking into consideration any investor participation, and then
propose and pursue deals that remain mutually profitable.
Expansive notions of fiduciary duties, however, may prevent just
such a sophisticated and jointly beneficial arrangement." A strict interpretation of fiduciary duties would prohibit an investor from authorizing conflicted transactions on the grounds that such approval would
amount to an impermissible attempt to waive fiduciary duties. This paternalistic construction of fiduciary duties mandates that those duties
are imposed precisely to override attempts by trustees to hornswoggle their beneficiaries into signing away legal protections. Needless to
say, the limited partners involved in multimillion-dollar private-equity
investments are extremely sophisticated parties whose interests are well
protected by the sentinels of wealth, legal representation, and financial
expertise; they certainly would not benefit from the mandatory imposition of crude and inflexible common law dictates.
3. Future possibilities for contractual agreements.
A vibrant academic, judicial, and practical debate addresses the
legitimacy of limited partners waiving their rights to fiduciary treatment
by general partners.61 We suspect, but do not know, that waiver of some
kind is currently practiced within the private-equity industry in some
circumstances. What we can say with some certainty is that to the extent waivers were used before, surely the use will now diminish in the
near term. For one, in the wake of down-round investments by private-equity firms, limited partners will be suspicious that the general
60

See Baird and Henderson, 60 Stan L Rev at 1339-40 (cited in note 4) ("Fiduciary duties

restrict free contracting in ways that are plainly inefficient.").
61 See, for example, Ribstein, 54 Wash & Lee L Rev at 571-77 (cited in note 25) (framing
the debate and discussing waiver of fiduciary duties in Delaware).
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partner is going to make conflicting investments (and thus be wary
about giving the general partner that latitude). In addition, limited
partners will know that they can hold out and demand ransom for that
risk. (This problem is the consequence of not receiving ex ante authorization for follow-on investments.) Perhaps general partners will be
willing to pay the price and so the actual number of waivers will return to their preexisting levels, but certainly their price will first go up
and thus lead to a short-term diminution in their usage.
It is difficult to imagine anyone objecting to ex ante waiver if the
waiving party is sophisticated, capable of bearing losses, and informed.
If an investor decides to permit down-round investments, whether or
not it decides to be a participant by bargaining for tag-along rights,
this decision should be respected and fall upon the responsibility of the
investment manager. All or nearly all investors in private equity satisfy
these prerequisites, so waiver should not be troubling. If private equity
becomes a retail investment, however, agency costs may increase, and
this may make waiver more problematic. 2
Midstream waivers are more problematic in that there may be an
element of coercion involved that clouds the legitimacy of any waiver.
Given this likely interpretation by courts, at least in Delaware but
more likely everywhere,6 we expect new private-equity contracts to
include specific provisions on the propriety of follow-on investments,
specifically in portfolio company debt. And, given the problems about
verifiability and monitoring of contractual promises by general partners not to invest, we should expect to see most general partners seeking authority to make such investments.
One way of reducing the uncertainty inherent in the waiver discussion above is to eliminate the concept of fiduciary duties altogether." In
private investing, eliminating fiduciary duties explicitly would put investors on notice that they must protect themselves by contract. This
position would force issues, like the propriety of down-round investing,
62 This possibility is beyond the scope of this Article. We will say that waivers should not be
a problem in well-functioning markets, since faithful agents of retail investors should make the
waiver decision in the way likely to increase the return to all investors. But these markets will
not necessarily work so well for reasons described elsewhere.
63 Industry practitioners advised us that courts would probably interpret mid-stream waivers as coercive. Chapin Interview (cited in note 31); Marphatia Interview (cited in note 16).
64 See Baird and Henderson, 60 Stan L Rev at 1316-17 (cited in note 4) (proposing to
"eliminate the concept of fiduciary duty" and replace it with "terms of the firm's investment
contracts, even when they lead to decisions that are not value-maximizing ex post"). In calling
for the replacement of fiduciary duties with contracts, Baird and Henderson argue that the uncertainty generated by a fiduciary overhang on contractual choice reduces the value of ex ante
bargains that are well struck but beyond the ken of those sitting in ex post judgment, especially
when the deal turns out badly. See id at 1328-33 (describing a "Contractarian Solution" to the
problems created by default rules of fiduciary duty).
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to the surface and clarify the rights and responsibilities of the partners.
To be sure, there may remain interpretive questions about the scope of
the bargains that are struck and the role of courts in cases where one
party deviates from its promises, as in the mutual fund timing example
above, but the level of uncertainty would be dramatically reduced.
Big-boy letters, which many courts are enforcing,' are a good example
of this, since they are a de facto waiver of fiduciary duties to resolve
information asymmetries in the trading of debt instruments. Parties to
these deals are comfortable with what they know and with what they
do not know, and the price reflects these unknowns. Pricing litigation
risk is much trickier, and litigation generates no social value that cannot be achieved by contract in these cases.
We do not expect courts to get out of the fiduciary duty business
entirely- although the Delaware legislature has come close to commanding courts to do so in certain limited partnership cases'-but we
can urge courts to enforce vigorously the private bargains that are well
struck. If they do this, the discussion of fiduciary duties collapses back
to waiver and to freedom of contract, which is where it should reside.
C. Exit: A Secondary Market for Private-equity Interests
Another solution to the conflicts we have described is to provide
exit options for investors. Conflicts of interest are ubiquitous in business law, and a standard solution or ameliorating factor is the existence of a liquid trading market that facilitates exit for investors. After
all, if participants in an enterprise can sell their interests quickly and
at a price likely to reflect actual value, this provides a strong incentive
for the managers of the enterprise to act responsibly and in the interests of investors. If exit is not available, the law, following Albert Hirschman,6' generally provides stakeholders with a voice over corporate
affairs in order to reduce agency costs. In other words, in the absence
of a say over corporate affairs, so long as investors have a viable exit
option, the risk of managerial misbehavior is reduced.
If limited partners in private-equity funds enjoyed liquid and
transparent means of withdrawing from their investments, they would
65
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For a discussion of "big-boy" letters and the leading cases, see id at 1337-41,1339 n 130.
See R&R Capita LLC v Buck & Doe Run Valley Farms LLC, 2008 WL 3846318, *4-5 (Del

Ch) (noting that Delaware's LLC Act is intended to allow parties maximum freedom of contract).
67
Examples include the market-out exception for appraisal proceedings, the general market for corporate control, and greater judicial oversight in close corporations. For a leading case,
see Wilkes v Springside Nursing Home, Inc, 353 NE2d 657, 662-64 (Mass 1976) (holding that
majority shareholders in close corporations owe fiduciary duties to minority shareholders and
that careful judicial scrutiny is necessary to protect the minority shareholders' rights).
68 See Albert 0. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms Organizations,and States 33-36 (Harvard 1970).
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neither need the vigorous protection of fiduciary duties nor be constrained by those duties from voluntarily and contractually ordering
their affairs otherwise. Market exits permit investors to protect themselves against the poor decisions of advisers while simultaneously disciplining advisers from making such decisions in the first instance.
Managers operating in markets in which individuals can quickly exit
take care to minimize this possibility. A well-functioning market solution is clearly preferable to the vagaries of judicial process, and correspondingly, judicial authorities are wont to impose fiduciary duties
when investors have the ability to walk away from their investment
financially unscathed.9
A vibrant secondary market of this sort would likely deter conflicts
of interest, in the same way that the liquid capital markets for the shares
of publicly held corporations do. A market for private-equity interests
akin to the market for corporate control in public companies would
provide discipline on managers, as well as an escape hatch to lessen
the losses in the event of misbehavior.
As it happens, the private-equity industry has developed such a
method for exit: disgruntled limited partners can, subject to certain
restrictions, sell their interest in a private-equity fund to another investor. This secondary market for private-equity interests, however, is
still relatively nascent, hampered by its lack of transparency and, most
importantly, bogged down by current legal rules that make market
transactions more costly than necessary to achieve efficient outcomes." This problem -the law getting in the way of market solutions
to resolve conflicts and increase the number of mutually beneficial
transactions -is a common theme in this Article.' With greater scrutiny and well-considered suggestions for maturation, this secondary market could prove to be an avenue for improving the overall health of the
private-equity industry generally and the problem with adviser-investor
conflicts specifically.
In order to better understand this potential solution, it is worth
considering a brief history of the market. The secondary market for
private-equity interests has existed for as long as the idea of private
equity. From the time of the industry's creation, the standard limited
partnership agreement has permitted limited partners to transfer their
interests to others, subject to the consent of a fund's general partner.
69

Hence, we see a sliding scale of fiduciary duties, with increasing seriousness as liquid

secondary markets are less available. Close corporations, for example, are subject to much greater judicial oversight than public ones. See note 67.
70

Hope Interview (cited in note 45).

As in the case of the unanimity solution discussed above, legal rules, like fiduciary duties,
COD tax regulations, and now partnership taxation rules, are barriers to optimal private ordering.
71
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Notwithstanding this long-standing option for exit, the secondary market has not always been particularly active or well advertised. Prior to
the late 1990s, a limited partner who felt the need to withdraw from a
private-equity investment was rarely eager to broadcast that news
widely, lest it generate a market perception that the limited partner was
in financial distress. Given the nature of limited partners and their
widespread financial interests, they preferred to keep any premature
need for liquidity quiet for fear that such disclosure might prove a
n
damaging revelation to their other business interests.
The stigma associated with sales of private-equity interests disappeared during the 2000s. Some prominent investors-for example,
David Swensen, who managed Yale University's endowment-earned
spectacular returns by rebalancing their portfolios away from traditional allocations in equity and fixed-income securities and towards
alternative asset classes like private-equity funds. This approach required regular tweaking of asset allocations, thus generating a need for
a secondary market in less-liquid assets. At the same time, the banking
industry generated strong volume in this secondary market with their
need for cash to meet solvency requirements and consolidation activities." Also, during the bust of the Internet equity boom, huge investment pools that had been raised to invest in now-unappetizing technology and Internet equities needed to find alternative investments,
such as private-equity deals. With a limited number of potential private-equity investments, but large amounts of capital looking for private-equity returns, secondary markets became more lucrative, and
thus concerns about stigma dissipated. 5
The ultimate exit strategy for secondary acquirers is typically to
hold the limited partnership interests until the maturity of the privateequity fund. Because the volume of sales of limited partnership interests typically rises during a bear market-when original investors de-

Hope Interview (cited in note 45).
See David F Swensen, PioneeringPortfolio Management:An UnconventionalApproach
to InstitutionalInvestment xii (Free Press 2000) (noting that Swensen's strategies created a higher
72
73

annualized rate of return than "96 percent of endowments and 98 percent of such institutional
funds as pensions"). See also id at 204-47 (advising on the proper role of "alternative asset
classes" such as real estate, private equity, and mezzanine finance in institutional investing);
David F Swensen, UnconventionalSuccess:A FundamentalApproach to PersonalInvestment 17-20
(Free Press 2005) (describing the changing diversification strategy of college and university endowments from 1993 to 2003, showing a clear move away from domestic equities, domestic bonds,
and cash and toward alternative asset classes).
74 See Marietta Cauchi, Coller Capital Steps Up US Presence,Wall St J 1 (Jan 19,2005).
75 Amy Cortese, Private Traders See Gold in Venture Capital Ruins, NY Times Money and
Business 4 (Apr 15,2001) (describing the explosion in secondary-market deals as venture capital
funds racked up losses).
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velop unforeseen needs for cash 76 - the activity and success of secondary
funds is somewhat countercyclical, providing another reason for their
appeal to large and variegated investors.
Some of the largest buyers in this space are themselves privateequity funds formed with the express purpose of acquiring these interests and, like all private-equity funds, eager to boost returns using leverage and expertise within this particular market niche. Coller Capital,
Lexington Partners, and Goldman Sachs are among the leading secondary buyers, each with multiple billion-dollar funds dedicated to
this strategy. The appeal of this business is multifaceted: "For buyers,
secondhand assets are more mature, and therefore less risky, especially in a venture portfolio. They can also be sold more quickly. On average, secondary investments are held for two to three years rather than
three to five-so investors see returns sooner."" When acquiring these
positions, secondary buyers must determine the present value for an
investment whose initial cost is dated and whose ultimate valuation is
speculative. Depending on the performance of the private-equity
fund's portfolio, therefore, a secondary buyer may pay either a premium or a discount to take the place of the original limited partner.
Obviously, determining an accurate-yet ultimately profitable- price
requires an intensive and diligent process of research into not only the
fund's specific portfolio investments but also the general partner's track
record and future strategy.
Contrary to what outsiders might expect, secondary purchasers
apparently do not attempt to renegotiate the terms of limited partnership interests. One could imagine a particularly powerful secondary
purchaser-Goldman Sachs, for instance -asking for side-letter concessions that would increase the value of its investment, such as preferable pricing terms on management or carry fees and unique mostfavored-nation clauses. Lawyers and bankers familiar with these transactions, however, maintain that secondary purchasers do not typically
ask for these concessions.
At one level, this is difficult to believe, and the denials we hear may
be simply propaganda of a sort. After all, if investors are treated differently (through side letters) depending on their value to the general
partner (in this and future deals), a prominent buyer of interests who
consolidates multiple, diffuse interests into a larger pool may be able
to extract rents from the general partner. In fact, an investment strate76
Id ("As the market has soured, a growing number of people who became limited partners in the booming market for venture capital in the 1990's are being hit by margin calls on
their stock investments, hefty tax bills and mounting stock market losses.").
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gy might simply be to consolidate ownership stakes and earn a better
deal through negotiation. General partners would be expected to resist
this, of course, and given the power they typically possess in LPAs (for
example, veto rights over the identity of secondary purchasers), this
may explain the current difficulties in a renegotiation strategy. In addition, consolidating claims would reduce their liquidity, since there
would be fewer buyers for larger and larger blocks of ownership interests. This too may reduce the desirability of assembling large blocks
of secondary market interests. There is a bit of a paradox here, however, since the secondary market would be more robust if profits could
be earned in this way. Ultimately, however, the existence of a market
with traders of different risk preferences and tolerances should be sufficient to provide the kind of pricing and discipline needed to reduce or
solve the conflicts problem.
Curiously, the general partners of private-equity funds have generally been cool to the development of a secondary market. One might
assume that, to the contrary, general partners would conclude that easier exit options ex post would encourage greater enthusiasm-and thus
better pricing-for initial private-equity investments ex ante. Yet, the
prospect of having to deal with a new limited partner and the substitution process appears to have dimmed the enthusiasm by general partners for these transactions. Industry insiders with whom we discussed
this topic stated that general partners do not appear interested in encouraging the growth of a robust secondary market in their limited
9 The attitude of general partners appears to be
partnership interests."
that this market does not convey a benefit to them, only administrative costs and potential liabilities from unvetted investors.'o
A common demand by general partners is that the acquirer of the
interest be an existing limited partner within the fund, thereby eliminating any need to audit the new investor for possible legal or regulatory problems. Another demand from a general partner might be for
the new limited partner to agree to what is known as a "staple deal."
In a staple deal, a secondary investor who acquires an interest in a
private-equity fund commits to certain capital contributions to future
funds launched by the general partner, thus tying-or stapling-the
two transactions together. Presumably, the administrative friction of
approving the secondary transaction will subsequently be offset by the
correspondingly diminished logistical challenges involved with future
fund commitments.
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Notwithstanding this lack of ardor by general partners, the secondary market has grown into a significant industry. Participants in the
business estimate that approximately 5 percent of limited partnership
81
interests will trade hands over their typical ten-year life. In a privateequity universe that raises approximately $200 billion each year, funds
that specialize in secondary acquisitions raise approximately $15 billion
annually, which of course is leveraged to acquire a much higher dollar
value of limited partnership interests. A recent investment by Goldman
Sachs shows that this market is vibrant and growing dramatically."
A potential legal barrier to the full development of a robust secondary market is the set of rules governing the taxation and trading
restrictions for "publicly traded partnerships" (PTPs). Congress amended
the tax code in 1987 to tax PTPs as corporations unless nearly all of the
PTP's income derived from "passive" sources, such as capital gains or
dividends." In addition, current Treasury regulations provide that these
partnership interests may not be traded on a public exchange if (1) the
interests are unregistered (as will be the case with most private-equity
fund interests, which are almost never registered ); and (2) the fund
does not have more than one hundred investors during any given
year." These requirements may be difficult but not impossible to satisfy, so a secondary exchange can theoretically exist. But, registration is
costly (in direct costs and in transparency, which may reveal proprietary strategies and open the firm up to litigation), and it will, on the
margin, deter liquidity in secondary markets. Some markets have arisen, such as NYPPEX Holdings, LLC, which hosts over $10 billion
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Hope Interview (cited in note 45).
See Peter Lattman, Goldman Goes All In on 'Secondary' Bet-Bank-led Group to Pay

About $1.5 Billion for Portfolio of Private-equity Investments, Wall St J C1 (Aug 13, 2008) (describing Goldman as "doubling down" in a $1.5 billion investment in a portfolio of secondary
market private-equity investments).
83 IRC § 7704(b)-(d) (creating an exception for publicly traded partnerships to not be treated
as a corporation if 90 percent of their income comes from "passive" sources). There is a robust
debate in the academic literature and in Congress on the tax rates that should apply to private-equity

compensation structures Compare Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing PartnershipProfits in
Private Equity Funds, 83 NYU L Rev 1, 57-58 (2008) (arguing for taxing management's take of
partnership profits as regular income), with David A. Weisbach, The Taxation of CarriedInterests
in PrivateEquity, 94 Va L Rev 715,762-64 (2008) (arguing for the current tax treatment). See also
S 1624, 110th Cong, 1st Sess (June 14,2007), in 153 Cong Rec S 7730 (June 14,2007) (proposing to
amend the tax code to eliminate the passive-type income exception for partnerships that derive
their income through investment advice or management services).
84 The exceptions to this overwhelming rule are the now-public private-equity firms, like
Blackstone. Ironically, it is the IPO of these firms that is driving reconsideration of these tax rules.
85 Treas Reg § 1.7704-1(h)(1) (2008) ("Interests in a partnership are not readily tradable on
a secondary market ... [if the] partnership does not have more than 100 partners.").
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secondary market in private-equity interests.8 This exchange purports
to avoid the PTP rules-citing an IRS private letter ruling to that effect-by arguing that the interests are not publicly traded because the
exchange is not a real "exchange," since it is not open to the public (it
requires a password and lots of money to invest), the amounts are small
percentages of the funds in question, and so forth.r In other words, the
investors in this exchange can fend for themselves, and therefore regulation is unnecessary.
In order to encourage secondary markets, which in turn have the
salutary effect of minimizing agency costs and conflicts of interest in
desegregated investments, existing regulations on secondary markets
should be liberalized. Placing inordinate restrictions on the secondary
exchange of private-equity interests (as the current Treasury regulations do) is problematic because huge benefits would flow from a vibrant secondary exchange and these are sophisticated parties who do
not need this kind of protection. Only four or five enormous investment houses currently trade in this market, and given that the privateequity direct market is populated solely by large pension funds, university endowments, and other qualified institutional buyers, it is reasonable to believe and expect the secondary market to contain the
most sophisticated investors that exist.
Although a full treatment of these regulations and their
(in)efficiencies is beyond the scope of this Article, it is likely possible to
rework the rules so as to satisfy both the needs of the tax authorities and
to encourage a robust secondary market in private-equity interests. To
the extent that this market could be nurtured and expanded, it might
provide more meaningful exit options to limited partners troubled by
the conflicted investments of general partners. Ideally, some day-trading
desks on which secondary interests are regularly priced would generate
far more liquid transactions in these interests. Limited partners who
would be willing to submit information about themselves to general
partners could be preapproved for transfers to assuage the concerns of
general partners that prefer to deal with investors already inside their
funds. Both advisers and investors would then enjoy the far-reaching
benefits of a smoothly operating secondary market.
If current regulatory barriers are removed, we would expect the
fledgling markets for these investments to mature naturally, and with
this, the problems we describe in this Article to be reduced. As this
happens, the strictness of fiduciary duties and the limits of waiver
86 NYPPEX Holdings, LLC, About, online at http://www.nyppex.comIWebpages/about.aspx
(visited Jan 11, 2009).
87 See generally IRS Private Letter Ruling No 111165-04 (2004), online at http://www.nyppe.
com/LinkDocs/IRSNYPPEPLRwolRS111.10.04.pdf (visited Jan 11, 2009).
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should be adjusted accordingly. Just as publicly traded firms owe lower
duties, so too should publicly traded private-equity investments reflect
the value of easy exit. Law can help develop these markets by removing obstacles to trading and by generating standardized forms and
default rules. Standardization of contracts can happen spontaneously,
through trade groups, or via the encouragement of disclosure models
like menus and default rules."
D. Diversification
Investors can also reduce the costs of any conflict (theoretically
to zero) by holding a diversified portfolio of private-equity investments. The intuition, which is well supported by the finance literature,
is that a fully diversified investor will sometimes suffer losses in, say,
an equity fund due to a general partner's conflict of interest in another
fund, but these losses will be offset by gains in other, say, debt funds in
which the conflicted general partner favors them. Ex ante and behind
the veil, an investor diversified in equity and debt funds will expect to
win sometimes and lose sometimes, and as long as investors are diversified across portfolios, these conflicts should not matter.
There are some caveats and important clarifying points that must
be made. As a threshold matter, the theory does not currently fit with
reality. Investors are not diversified across funds, and the lawyers and
fund managers we interviewed suggested that conflicts are a real
problem for their clients and investors." There are several reasons for
the current lack of diversification. Investments in private-equity funds
are typically quite large-an average might be about $100 millionand being well diversified across many funds would be a very expensive form of conflict insurance. This is exacerbated by the lock-in of
capital currently required for most investments.
1. Intrafund manager diversification.
Intrafund manager diversification would involve an investor investing across the entire range of funds sponsored by a particular general partner, or at least those with potential conflicts. There can be no
conflict between Fund A (equity) and Fund B (debt) if the investors in
both are perfectly overlapping in identity and interest, and have voluntarily contracted for their investment stakes. After all, any decision
made by the general partner to favor Fund B over Fund A is simply
moving money from an investor's one pocket to the other.
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This kind of diversification could be achieved by giving investors
a right of first refusal to invest in any fund sponsored by the general
partner, especially those in which the new fund may take a conflicting
position in a portfolio company in which the investor is already committed. Since the potential for conflict is not always readily apparent
at the time of the fund formation, the right of first refusal might sensibly be offered on all new funds. In addition, since the potential for
conflict, or the magnitude of the conflict, might not be apparent to
even sophisticated investors, some disclosure by the general partner as
to the potential for conflict and its expected impact would be sensible.
A more radical approach would be to require a staple deal for followon debt funds in all cases. Such an approach will increase costs on all
deals, even where not needed, and will deter private-equity investments on the margin.
One potential problem with this "solution" is that the general
partner may have reason to obfuscate its down-round investment to
avoid the tax hit from buying back the debt of an affiliated entity. A
staple deal, for example, is tax disadvantaged compared with more
elaborate structures in which there is not unity of ownership. There
are very few public details about the nature of these down-round investments, so we cannot know-and undoubtedly not all limited partners know-how they are structured. Since the IRS may treat obvious
structures as equivalent to joint ownership for the purposes of COD
tax obligations, general partners may have incentives to be as opaque
as possible, even to some or all limited partners.
Even the simplest tax-avoidance structure-creating a joint venture
with other investment managers in which the general manager owns less
than 50 percent-is not easily diversifiable for existing equity fund investors. The general partner could offer each limited partner in a potentially
conflicting equity fund a pro rata share of the general partner's interest
in the joint venture debt fund. This might allay some concerns, but it
might not offer full protection, because the general partner will be outvoted by the other coventurers in the fund (a prerequisite of favorable
tax treatment), and the general partner might be compensated beyond
its ownership stake in ways that would create a conflict where the pure
investment stakes would suggest there is not one.
2. Interfund manager diversification.
Interfund manager diversification, on the other hand, would involve an investor holding a mixed portfolio of equity and debt investments from a variety of different general partners. With a sufficient
number of investments, the investor should be less concerned with
conflict of interest (or, perhaps, indifferent to it), even if the investor
does not own offsetting positions in a particular fund or specific invest-
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ment. This is because the investor will expect at the time of the investment to win some and lose some; unless the wins or losses are systematically biased, the investor should be indifferent. As discussed above, this
type of diversification currently is not practiced or even possible.
We certainly can imagine investment products that would serve
this portfolio diversification function. Recent years have seen a spate
of similar diversification products created for underlying securities
that were traditionally considered illiquid and chunky. For example,
bank loans were traditionally originated and held by the lender for the
term of the loan. Lenders could sell loans, but the market was small,
trading was thin, and borrowers often restricted such loan sales through
contract. (The analogy to limited partners selling their private-equity
interests is nearly perfect.) In the past decade, however, credit derivatives have been created that allow ownership interests to be more dynamic, say by allowing the lender to offload some of the risk of default.9' There could be exchange-traded funds (ETFs), indexes, and
secondary derivative markets for these investments without upsetting
the primary market. If these products and markets develop, it will greatly reduce the too-many-hats problem we describe.
E.

Architectural Protections from Conflicts

Perhaps the simplest means of addressing potential adviser-investor
conflicts in private-equity funds is the approach already widely adopted
in the industry: architectural protections. By engineering structures that
are intended to segregate the activities of different investment divisions,
advisers can unilaterally attempt to assuage their investors that no nefarious activities are consciously being undertaken. Of course, while the
adoption of these segregation techniques signals a certain fidelity to fiduciary principles, they suffer from lamentable yet inescapable limitations.
Advisers have long since erected communication barricades between themselves and their affiliates within the same money manager's broad corporate structure. Accordingly, investment personnel, computer servers, client files, and similar administrative systems are often
segregated, electronically and geographically, from one another. Any
decisions subsequently made by a private-equity fund to acquire distressed debt of a portfolio company of, for example, a hedge fund within
the same corporate structure can therefore be dismissed as coincidental
and without malicious intent.

90 See Frank Partnoy and David A. Skeel, Jr, The Promise and Peril of Credit Derivatives,
75 U Cin L Rev 1019,1022-31 (2007) (discussing the rise, usage, and potential upsides and downsides of credit derivatives).
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These sorts of firewalls have long existed within professional services firms to deal with conflicts of interest. Because they cost money
to install and impose operational inefficiencies upon the adviser, they
are at the very least a means by which an adviser may post a bond to
demonstrate the adviser's seriousness of purpose. And beyond just
good optics, these barriers may succeed in preventing mundane or
low-level sharing of information across investment divisions.
The problem, of course, is that every money manager, no matter
how sprawling, ultimately owes all obedience to a unified management
structure at the top. There will always be at least one person, therefore,
who is aware of the conflicting positions being taken by the firm as a
whole. Because that person no doubt has the authority to approve or
disapprove of specific investment decisions, architectural protections
are, in the final analysis, largely cosmetic.
Another similar solution would be to formalize or even legally
require the use of independent advisory boards. Advisory boards currently comprise representatives from existing limited partners, and
these investors can be expected to be rather imperfect monitors of
conflicts of interest from which they are the most likely beneficiaries.
An "independent" board of advisers might provide a more robust check
on conflicts, but this solution just pushes the problem back a level to
questions about who appoints the independent advisers, who is independent, and how and to whom the board is accountable. The problems with and costs of this solution have been raised elsewhere in the
context of such boards for mutual fund complexes."
To the extent that other, contractual or market, mechanisms develop for policing and enforcing adviser-investor conflicts more effectively, these architectural provisions might best be removed to save
costs to all parties.
CONCLUSION

In this Article, we have described the new investing environment
in private equity and the potential conflicts that it is likely to create,
offered reasons why existing law and regulation exacerbate instead of
reduce these conflicts, and proposed remedies for limited partners and
the law. Our approach throughout is one of respect for well-struck
bargains by the sophisticated investors involved in these cases, tempered by an awareness that the old equilibrium is no more. The state

91 The fact that advisory board members are investors cuts both ways. These investors are
likely to know the business well, but they may also be preferred investors who are given special
treatment (and thus have clouded judgment) in the conflict cases we describe in this Article.
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of the market today is in flux, and the new equilibrium is one that we
can still improve by setting the right role for law.
We hope to have shown that the desegregation of finance has
come to private equity and that its impact, although now unknown, is
likely to reshape significantly the way in which funds are formed and
operated. Private-equity firms are now beginning to invest in the debt
of firms that they took private, with the consequence of creating a potential conflict of interest among different investors in equity and debt
funds managed by the firm. Although unanimity of investors (or consent) is a solution to this problem, we show why this is unlikely to be
the case generally and why it has not been the case for deals that have
already been done. Reasons include practical considerations that have
little to do with external law, such as the limits on investment types or
amounts in the founding documents of investors in these funds. We
point out, however, that tax rules inhibit the resolution or pricing of
these conflicts by giving fund managers incentives to make their potentially conflicting transactions less transparent. Fiduciary duties are
not a help either, since they create residual risk of liability, even in the
face of seemingly valid waivers.
We offer some potential solutions-and explore their limitationsbased on experiences in other investment markets. The existence of a
secondary market in private-equity interests represents the most promising mechanism for reducing agency costs, of which the down-round
conflict is merely one example. In a world in which investment interests are priced and relatively freely transferable, the pressures on fund
managers to behave would be much stronger if such a secondary market existed. The law can aid this market by interpreting contractual
choice, especially in new funds, in light of the principals of freedom of
contract and clarity of form set forth here. Investors are unlikely to offset the risk of potential conflicts of interest fully, but an awareness of
the problem, coupled with judicial modesty and clarity, as well as a new
market for investments, should help reduce these costs for all investors.

